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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This court has appellate jurisdiction over this case, 
which was transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), 1953 as amended. 
This appeal arises from an action for the recovery of 
the value of real property which plaintiff, Mary Jean 
Freebairn, sold in 1971 (the "property") to defendant J. 
Russell Scott. Plaintiff's appeal is from a decision of no 
cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is plaintiff entitled to annul the 1971 sale of 
her property to Mr. Scott, as a matter of law, for the reason 
that: (a) after the sale of the property Mr. Scott was 
appointed guardian over plaintiff; (b) Mr. Scott did not obtain 
judicial approval, as guardian for plaintiff, of plaintiff's 
signing a deed for property which she had conveyed before the 
guardianship proceedings were initiated; and (c) plaintiff 
signed the deed to the property after a guardian was appointed, 
although she executed the Earnest Money Agreement and closed 
the sale of the property before the guardianship proceedings? 
2. Is there sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's findings of fact that: (a) plaintiff had the capacity 
to contract and convey her property when she sold it to Mr. 
Scott; and (b) the sale to Mr. Scott was fair and defendants 
did not exercise fraud or undue influence over plaintiff? 
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3. Can this court impose a constructive trust on the 
proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale of the property he purchased from 
plaintiff where there are no findings by the trial court, or 
evidence in support thereof, pertaining to the elements for a 
constructive trust? 
CODIFIED LAW REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation would be 
determinative of any issue, legal or factual, presently before 
this court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Mary Jean Freebairn, plaintiff, and defendant J. 
Russell Scott are first cousins who separately inherited real 
property from their uncle near the cottonwood canyons. 
(Memorandum Decision & Judgement ("Judgment"), Findings of Fact 
U 1; Brief of Plaint iff/Appellant Mary Jean Freebairn 
("Appellant's Brief") pp. 6-7, and Appendix I.) 
2. During the 1960's, plaintiff sold 15 acres of her 
property to Mr. Scott in order to obtain money to pay her 
debts. (Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 3; Reporter's Transcript 
on Appeal ("Record") pp. 10-15; Appellant's Brief pp. 9-10.) 
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3. In 1968, plaintiff entered into a trust agreement 
with her brother Samuel Freebairn and his wife, Agnes 
Freebairn, for the purpose of developing plaintiff's property. 
Under the terms of the trust agreement, Samuel and Agnes 
Freebairn agreed to purchase the remainder of plaintiff's 
property, with the property subject to a trust agreement with 
Security Title Comany, and with payments made on a f?lot 
release" basis. (Judgment, Findings of Fact Hlf 4, 7; Record 
pp. 27-28, 213-14, 520-24, Exhibit 32-P; Appellant's Brief pp. 
10-11.) 
4. Samuel and Agnes Freebairn encumbered the land by 
a mortgage in order to obtain money to finance the development 
of the property. Samuel Freebairn, however, died shortly 
thereafter in 1969, and Agnes Freebairn was unable to develop 
the property or make the payments on the mortgage. (Judgment, 
Findings of Fact HH 5-6; Record pp. 522-25; Appellant's Brief 
p. 13.) 
5. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn, facing the risk of 
losing the property, agreed to sell the property, and both 
contacted Le R Burton, a real estate agent, to have the 
property offered for sale. (Judgment, Findings of Fact 
HH 10-11; Record pp. 525-27, 676-80; Appellant's Brief p. 14.) 
6. Plaintiff and Agnes Freebairn established an 
asking price for the property and had Mr. Burton list the 
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property for sale in the multiple listing book and advertise it 
by sign and in a newspaper of state-wide circulation, 
(Judgment, Findings of Fact ITU 11-12; Record pp. 525-33, 
680-91.) 
7. After the property was unsuccessfully offered for 
sale for a period of time, plaintiff sought out Mr. Scott to 
purchase the property. Mr. Scott initially rejected the offer, 
but later agreed to purchase the property to help plaintiff and 
Agnes Freebairn with their financial problems. On January 13, 
1971, after no other buyers could be found, plaintiff had Mr. 
Burton prepare an earnest money agreement for the sale and 
purchase of the property. Mr. Scott signed the agreement, 
agreeing to pay plaintiff's asking price. The agreement also 
provided that the proceeds from the sale would be placed in a 
"protective trust" for the purpose of safeguarding the assets 
and welfare of plaintiff. (Judgment, Findings of Fact HIT 13, 
15-16; Record pp. 68-88, 527-33, 682-97, Exhibit 12-P.) 
8. Prior to the closing of the sale, plaintiff and 
Mr. Scott consulted with LaMar Duncan, an attorney, regarding 
the creation of a trust for the sale proceeds. Mr. Duncan, 
however, recommended that instead of a trust, a guardianship be 
created. Both plaintiff and Mr. Scott relied on Mr. Duncan's 
representations concerning the creation of a guardianship in 
lieu of a trust. (Judgment, Findings of Fact UU 16,30; Record 
pp. 90-94, 698-700, 784-86.) 
-4-
9. The closing for the sale of the property took 
place on March 1, 1971 which was before the guardianship 
proceedings were initiated. At the closing, plaintiff did not 
execute a deed because the property was still subject to the 
1968 trust agreement with Security Title Company. (Judgment, 
Findings of Fact H1T 17, 32-33; Record pp. 106-11; Appellant's 
Brief p. 17.) 
9. On March 22, 1971, the guardianship was created, 
with Mr. Scott named as guardian. On March 23, 1971, the 1968 
trust was terminated, and plaintiff executed a deed to the 
property. (Judgment, Findings of Fact HH 9, 18-19, 34; Record 
pp. 110-12, 393-97. ) 
10. Plaintiff received all the payments from Mr. 
Scott which she was owed for the sale of her property. 
(Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 29; Record pp. 772-84.) 
11. During the time period immediately after 
plaintiff sold her property, real estate values in the area 
increased dramatically. (Judgment, Findings of Fact IT 23; 
Record pp. 420-23, 650-52; Complaint.) 
12- The trial court found, in rejecting plaintiff's 
cause of action to have the sale annulled, that the sales price 
paid by Mr. Scott was fair and consistent with the fair market 
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value at the time; that plaintiff was intelligent and educated; 
that she factually understood the consequences of the sale of 
her property; that she was competent to enter into a binding, 
legal contract and to sell her property; and that defendants 
did not take advantage of plaintiff, exercise undue influence 
over her or perpetrate a fraud upon her by purchasing her 
property. (Judgment, Findings of Fact 1T1F 24-25, 27, 
Conclusions IF IT 1, 3-4, 6; Record pp. 68-94, 481-97, 525-33, 
614, 666-99.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In Point I of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff raises 
three issues of law. Each of these issues, and consequently 
plaintiff's arguments in support thereof, are immaterial for 
the reason that they are based on the faulty premise that 
plaintiff sold her property when she signed the deed after a 
guardian had been appointed. Plaintiff does not challenge the 
fact that she executed the Earnest Money Agreement and closed 
the sale of her property before guardianship proceedings were 
initiated. Consequently, the sale was completed and the 
property was conveyed before a guardian was appointed. Each of 
plaintiff's arguments, therefore, must fail. Moreover, 
plaintiff's arguments fail to correctly state or apply Utah 
law. A sale of property by a ward to her guardian, or the 
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ward's signing of a deed, does not render the transaction void 
as a matter of law. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to 
provide any relevant reason why the trial court's judgment 
should not be affirmed. 
2. Plaintiff challenges certain findings of fact in 
Points II and III of Appellant's Brief. Plaintiff ignores the 
complete record and only cites her own evidence, arguing that 
the trial court should have found in her favor. In addition to 
her failure to apply the appropriate standard of appellate 
review to the trial court's findings of fact, plaintiff is 
unable to successfully argue that the findings are in error 
because substantial evidence was presented at trial upon which 
the trial court relied. There are no grounds, therefore, for 
disturbing the findings of the trial court. 
3. Finally, plaintiff argues in Point IV of 
Appellant's Brief that this court should impose the remedy of a 
constructive trust against the benefits Mr. Scott received from 
later selling the property he purchased from plaintiff. Not 
only has plaintiff failed to show how she is entitled to such 
relief, either before this court or the court below, but there 
are no findings to support such a judgment, nor has plaintiff 
pointed to sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
necessary elements for this remedy exist. It is inappropriate 
for plaintiff to seek relief from this court when there is no 
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factual basis for the relief sought. Plaintiff's request for a 
constructive trust, therefore, should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF SOLD HER PROPERTY BEFORE A GUARDIAN 
WAS APPOINTED OVER HER; THEREFORE, SHE HAS 
FAILED TO RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF LAW THAT 
WOULD JUSTIFY ANY RELIEF SHE MAY BE SEEKING. 
A. MR. SCOTT PURCHASED PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY BEFORE 
HE WAS APPOINTED TO BE PLAINTIFF'S GUARDIAN, AND 
EVEN IF HE HAD BEEN HER GUARDIAN, UTAH LAW WOULD 
NOT VOID THE SALE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff first argues that the sale of her real 
property to Mr. Scott is void, as a matter of law, because he 
was plaintiff's guardian when the sale took place. This 
argument is erroneous for two reasons. First, Mr. Scott was 
not plaintiff's guardian when plaintiff sold him the property, 
and second, Utah law would not render the sale void even if Mr. 
Scott had been her guardian at the time of the sale. 
The trial court found that plaintiff entered a valid 
and legally binding contract to sell her property when she 
executed the Earnest Money Agreement and when she in fact 
closed the sale of the property before the guardianship 
proceedings were initiated. The only element of the entire 
transaction which followed the institution of the guardianship 
proceedings was the execution of the deed. This act was only a 
formality arising out of the binding obligation already created 
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by the Earnest Money Agreement and the Closing Statement. 
(Record pp. 68, 105-06; Exhibits 12-P, 16-P.) 
In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), 
the court stated that: 
Under an installment land sale contract . . . 
the vendee is treated as the owner of the 
land . . . The doctrine of equitable 
conversion characterizes the seller1s 
interest as an interest in personalty and not 
as one in realty, whereas the vendee's 
interest under the executory contract is 
deemed an interest in realty. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Id. at 1254-55. This court entered a similar holding in Lach 
v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), wherein the 
court stated that an earnest money agreement is a legally 
binding executory contract under which the purchaser acquires 
an interest in the property at the moment it is created, and 
after which the purchaser is treated as the owner of the land. 
Id. at 805. 
The fact that the sale and conveyance occurred when 
plaintiff executed her Earnest Money Agreement is further 
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1 (1953), which was in 
effect during the ti.ne period critical to the transaction at 
issue, which reads: 
The term "conveyance'1' as used in this title 
shall be construed to embrace every 
instrument in writing by which any real 
estate, or interest in real estate, is 
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or 
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assigned, except wills and leases for a term 
not exceeding one year. 
The Utah Supreme Court said of this broad statute that "real 
property may be conveyed without the use of a deed. Stucki v. 
Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 493, 201 P.2d 486, 490 (1949). Accord, 
Bunnel v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 85, 368 P.2d 597, 599 (1962). 
Pursuant to the above authorities, plaintiff legally 
conveyed title to her property when she executed the Earnest 
Money Agreement and closed the sale. The fact that plaintiff 
sold her property to defendant before the guardianship 
proceedings were initiated renders plaintiff's argument 
immaterial since Mr. Scott was not plaintiffTs guardian when he 
purchased her property. 
Plaintiff has not challenged the trial court's finding 
that, 'f[t]he appointment of a guardian following the sale was 
not in and of itself a basis for voiding the sale." (Judgment, 
Conclusions U 2.) Plaintiff's argument ignores this finding. 
Consequently, the question of law raised in plaintiff's 
argument is meaningless. Plaintiff's faulty presumption that 
the sale took place during the guardianship, rather than before 
it, carries over into plaintiff's other arguments as well, also 
rendering them merit less. 
In addition, even if Mr. Scott had been plaintiff's 
guardian when she sold him her property, there is no Utah law 
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to support plaintiff's contention that the sale would be void. 
In Farley v. Farley, 19 Utah 2d 301, 431 P.2d 133 (1967), 
which was the only Utah authority cited in support of 
plaintiff's argument, the court held that the plaintiff was 
acting as trustee for her minor children in asserting a quiet 
title claim to property that was the subject of a divorce 
decree. This case clearly speaks of trustees who deal with the 
res of the trust, and is distinguishable from the facts before 
this court. Most of plaintiff's other authorities are 
distinguished for the same reason; they apply only to a 
trustee's sale of trust property to the trustee. No Utah law 
has been found that holds a ward's sale of property to his 
guardian to be void. 
A guardian's purchase of property sold by the ward is 
merely voidable. See In re Howard's Estate, 133 Cal. 2d 535, 
284 P.2d 966, 970 (1955) (citing 25 Am. Jur. 131, § 210). 
Plaintiff miscites this case to support her argument that such 
sales are void. 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward § 99 n. 68 (1976). 
Moreover, additional text of this section of C.J.S., of which 
plaintiff cites only a portion, reads that cases hold "that 
such a purchase is not as a rule to be deemed void, but merely 
voidable." Other courts have likewise found transactions 
between wards and guardians to be merely voidable, and not void 
as a matter of law. Matter of Conservatorship of Spindle, 733 
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P.2d 388, 390 (Okl. 1987) ("a transaction may be voidable, but 
it is not automatically void"); In re Guardianship of Chandas, 
18 Ariz. App. 583, 504 P.2d 524, 527 (1972) (de facto guardian 
had burden to show that transaction was fair and free from 
undue influence). 
Although there is no Utah case law on the precise 
issue raised by plaintiff, Utah law would follow the approach 
expressed in the above-cited authorities. Where a ward 
transacts business with another, the Utah Supreme Cout has 
stated that there is prima facie evidence of the incompetency 
of the ward, which may be rebutted by evidence that the ward 
was competent to transact the business. Home Town Finance 
Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 31, 368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962). 
( See also infra Point IC.) Hence if the ward transacts 
business with his guardian, the transaction would be merely 
voidable depending on whether the guardian could overcome the 
presumption of incompetence. 
Mr. Scott was not plaintiff's guardian at the time 
plaintiff sold him her property. In fact, guardianship 
proceedings had not even been initiated when the sale closed. 
Plaintiff's argument that the sale is void as a matter of law, 
therefore, is without merit. Yet even if the facts were 
otherwise, Utah law would not render the transaction void. 
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B. PLAINTIFF SOLD HER PROPERTY BEFORE THE 
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, RENDERING 
JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTION 
OF THE DEED UNNECESSARY. 
Plaintiff argues next that the deed plaintiff executed 
on March 23, 1971, after a guardian was appointed, was void for 
lack of judicial authorization. Again, this argument is 
meritless for the reason that plaintiff sold her property 
before a guardian had been appointed over her. Moreover, the 
ruling of the trial court below has the effect of authorizing 
the sale and rendering this argument moot. 
Each of the statutes cited by plaintiff deals with 
"sales" of the ward's property. Former Section 75-13-32 read 
that a guardian must not "make any sale of [the ward's] 
property without the order of the court." [Emphasis added.] 
Section 75-13-33 continued that "the guardian may sell . . . 
real estate, upon obtaining an order of the court." [Emphasis 
added.] Sections 75-13-41; 75-10-2 and 75-10-3 were similar. 
Plaintiff sold her property to Mr. Scott on January 
13, 1971, when plaintiff prepared the Earnest Money Agreement 
and had Mr. Scott sign it. The sale was closed on March 1, 
1971. Because the property was subject to a trust agreement 
that had not yet been terminated, plaintiff could not deliver 
the deed at closing. On the very day the trust agreement was 
terminated, however, plaintiff executed the deed. Only the 
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execution of the deed occurred after a guardian was appointed. 
Pursuant to the authorities cited in subsection A of this 
Point, the sale and conveyance of plaintiff's property occurred 
before plaintiff had a guardian; hence, there was no sale to be 
judicially authorized when plaintiff signed the deed. 
The trial court found that, "[t]he failure to obtain 
court approval for the execution of a deed after the guardian 
was appointed did not void the deed." (Judgment, Conclusions IT 
5.) Plaintiff has not contested the court's findings that the 
property was sold before she executed the deed. Therefore, 
plaintiff is unable to successfully argue that the sale 
occurred when the deed was executed and that the act of signing 
the deed needed judicial approval under the probate code. 
Moreover, the validity of the transaction between 
plaintiff and Mr. Scott was certainly confirmed by the trial 
court below. Consequently, title has now passed and plaintiff 
is unable to claim the deed to be void. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-10-3, as cited by plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, is not 
entitled to relief on the ground that the deed she executed was 
void. 
C. PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONVEY TITLE TO HER 
PROPERTY AFTER A GUARDIAN WAS 
APPOINTED, AND EVEN IF SHE HAD, UTAH 
LAW MERELY CREATES A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF INCOMPETENCY WHEN A WARD 
CONVEYS REAL PROPERTY. 
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Plaintiff also argues that she lacked the legal 
capacity to convey title to her property because she signed the 
deed after a guardian had been appointed for her. Once again, 
the fallacy of this argument lies in the erroneous premise that 
the conveyance did not occur until the deed was signed. 
Plaintiff conveyed title to her property when she executed the 
Earnest Money Agreement and closed the sale, all of which 
occurred before guardianship proceedings were initiated. 
( See supra subsection A.) The question of whether a ward 
can legally convey real property after the guardianship 
appointment is not even at issue on the facts of this case. 
Even if plaintiff's performing the formality of 
signing the deed after the sale was closed were to be construed 
as the conveyance of the real property, the fact that a 
guardian was appointed at that time would merely create a 
presumption of incompetency; it would not render the conveyance 
void as plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff has not cited any Utah 
authority for her argument that the conveyance would be void, 
and she cannot because Utah law is expressly to the contrary. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that the 
appointment of a guardian is only prima facie evidence of 
incompetency to contract and may be rebutted. In Home Town 
Finance Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 31, 368 P.2d 72, 76 
(1962), the court held: 
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[T]he appointment of a guardian is prima 
facie evidence of the incompetency of the 
ward, but . . . such prima facie [evidence] 
may be rebutted by evidence which shows that 
the ward was competent to understandingly 
manage his business affairs and enter into 
contracts at a time of making the alleged 
contract in question. 
Accord, Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519, 
522-23 (10th Cir. 1960) (construing Utah law). In Brisacher, 
the court held that a person may meet the statutory definition 
of the mental condition necessary to establish a guardianship 
and nevertheless be competent to contract. The court stated 
that "the recognition by a court in Utah that a person is 
incompetent to manage his affairs [under U.C.A. 75-13-20] is 
not tantamount to an adjudication that he is incapable of 
intelligently entering a contract." Brisacher, 277 F.2d at 
522. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "the 
test as to the capacity to execute a will, or trust deed, or 
enter into other transactions, is quite different from the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 75-13-20 (1953), relating to 
the appointment of a guardian." Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 
890, 893 (Utah 1976) (followed in Matter of Estate of Kesler, 
702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985)). 
The most plaintiff can gain by arguing that a guardian 
was appointed when she conveyed her property is that defendants 
would be required to prove she was competent at the time of the 
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conveyance. ( See infra Point IIA.) Hence, even if 
plaintiff were held to have conveyed her property at the time 
she performed the formality of signing the deed, which was 
after the guardianship appointment, the conveyance would not be 
void as a matter of law. This issue, nevertheless, remains 
immaterial since plaintiff conveyed ownership to the property 
before guardianship proceedings were even initiated. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS, AND SHE IS UNABLE TO DO SO FOR 
THE REASON THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS. 
In Points II and III of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff 
presents questions of fact. Namely, did she have the mental 
capacity to sell her property? and did Mr. Scott unfairly 
benefit from the sale? Plaintiff argues before this court that 
the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that plaintiff 
was competent to contract at the time she sold the property, 
and that the sale was fair and without fraud or undue 
influence. Plaintiff, however, fails to apply this standard of 
review, and her arguments merely recite evidence in her favor. 
It is not the function of this court to hear 
reargument on how the evidence should have been construed at 
trial. Neither will this court second guess the trial court's 
findings and decision. Cf. City Electric v. Industrial 
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Indemnity Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Utah 1984) (evidence is 
construed in a light most favorable to the judgment of the 
trial court). In fact, this court will affirm a trial court's 
decision whenever it can do so on a proper ground. Bill Nay & 
Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 
1123 (Utah 1984). 
In light of these principles, this court has stated, 
with respect to its review of findings of fact, that: 
In order to challenge the trial court's findings 
of fact, an appellant must first ?fmarshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's finding 
and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." [Citation omitted.] 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 
1988). The Utah Supreme Court, in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147 (Utah 1987), previously expressed the same standard of 
appellate review to be applied to findings of fact. In 
Ashton, the court stated: 
The court begins its analysis with the trial 
court's findings of fact, not with an 
appellant's view of the way he or she 
believes the facts should have been found. 
[Appellants] have not even begun to 
seriously discuss the trial court's findings 
that dispute their version of the facts. In 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., we explained the duty 
incumbent upon an appellant to mount a 
successful challenge to a trial court's 
findings of fact. An appellant must marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial 
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court's findings. Only then can we consider 
whether those findings are "clearly 
erroneous." Because [appellants] have 
failed to make such a showing, the trial 
court's findings will not be disturbed. 
Id. at 150. 
After mounting all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, plaintiff must also demonstrate how the 
challenged findings, which are based on that evidence, are 
clearly erroneous. In Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 
1984), the court stated: 
[T]he standard of appellate review in equity 
cases, even where the level of proof from 
the trial court is clear and convincing 
evidence, is that of clear preponderance. 
Therefore, where the evidence is in 
conflict, this court will not upset the 
findings in the trial court unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates against 
them that this court is convinced that a 
manifest injustice has been done. 
Id. at 105. In applying this standard, the court has stated 
that it is mindful of the advantaged position of the trial 
judge who sees and hears the witnesses. Jensen v. Brown, 639 
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). Hence, there is not only indulged a 
presumption of correctiness of the findings and judgment of the 
trial judge, but the findings and judgment will not be reversed 
where there is merely conflicting evidence. Dang v. Cox 
Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah 1982); Ovard v. Cannon, 600 
P.2d 1246, 1248 (Utah 1979). 
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The clearly erroneous standard has been codified 
through the recent amendment to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. ;See Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n. 3 
(Utah 1986). Rule 52(a) reads, in pertinent part, that: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
should be given to the appointment of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The court has interpreted this language as follows: 
[T]he content of Rule 52(a) fs ffclearly 
erroneous1' standard . . . requires that if 
the findings . . . are against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and 
confirm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings . . . will be set aside. 
State in Interest of T.E. v. S.E., 761 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 
App. 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 19L, 193 (Utah 
1987)). 
Due to the plaintiff's failure to cite the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact, plaintiff is now 
unable to provide any argument showing how the findings are 
erroneous. Plaintiff has only cited to her own evidence, and 
she merely reargues how her evidence would support a finding in 
her favor. This court, therefore, is unable to consider 
whether the trial court's findings are based on sufficient 
evidence. As in Ashton, the trial court's findings should be 
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affirmed, since plaintiff has failed to make the necessary 
showing. 
Even though plaintiff cannot have the findings of the 
trial court set aside because of her failure to consider and 
meet the appropriate standard of appellate review, the findings 
of the trial court should not be disturbed for the additional 
reason that they are amply supported by evidence presented at 
trial. Hence, plaintiff would be unable to show that the trial 
court's findings are clearly erroneous even if she would have 
tried to properly make such a showing. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS COMPETENT TO CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff's arguments on the issue of her competency 
to contract, made in Point II of Appellant's Brief, are 
meritless. First, she argues that defendants had the burden to 
prove her competency because she was appointed a guardian at 
the time she signed the deed, thereby creating a presumption of 
incompetency. However, as discussed under Point I, supra, 
there is no dispute that she entered into a binding contract to 
sell the property, which effectively transferred title and 
ownership, before the guardianship proceedings were initiated. 
Since she did not have a guardian at the time she actually 
conveyed her property, the burden does not shift to defendants 
to prove her competency to sell the property. The rest of 
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plaintiff's arguments rely on this faulty premise and must, 
therefore, also fail. 
Although defendants did not have the burden to prove 
that plaintiff was competent to contract, the trial court 
found, that in the event the defendants did have this burden 
because of the subsequent guardianship appointment, the 
evidence sufficiently showed that the plaintiff was in fact 
competent to contract at the time she sold her property and 
signed the deed. (Judgment, Law I.) 
Even assuming that defendants did have the burden to 
prove plaintiff's competency to contract, plaintiff is also 
wrong in construing Utah law to require them to prove she also 
had the ability to make a "rational decision." The test for 
determining the mental capacity to contract in Utah, as set 
forth in Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 260, 159 P.2d 142, 
146 (1945) which was cited by plaintiff, states as follows: 
Were the mental faculties so deficient or 
impaired that there was not sufficient power 
to comprehend the subject of the contract, 
its nature and its probable consequences, 
and to act with discretion in relation 
thereto. 
Plaintiff relies on Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 15, to claim that the test of incompetency 
consists of a second part that relates to the ability to make a 
rational decision. No Utah case authority, however, is cited 
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to show that Utah accepts the bifurcated approach advocated by 
plaintiff or that the Utah test goes beyond the ability to 
understand or act with discretion in relation to one's 
understanding. 
The test enunciated by the court in Anderson v. 
Thomas was again relied upon by the court in Peterson v. 
Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978). After reciting the test as 
set forth in Anderson, the court analyzed the evidence as 
follows: 
Mr. Harmon testified that after having 
talked with Mrs. Peterson [the plaintiff], 
and after her various questions about the 
effect of the sale had been answered, "there 
was no question in my mind that she knew 
what she was doing and she wanted the home 
to go to Mr, and Mrs. Carter [the 
defendants]." After this meeting and before 
the actual conveyance, Mr. Harmon contacted 
one Anna Broadhead, Mrs. Peterson's closest 
living relative, to inform her of the plans 
to sell the property and to ask if there 
were any objections. Mrs. Broadhead said 
she thought it would be best to sell the 
property. Although other testimony might 
show Mrs. Peterson's incompetence, we are 
inclined to defer to the trial court's 
decision due to his proximity to the 
situation and his ability to observe the 
witnesses and their demeanor. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Id. at 331. No analysis of Mrs. Peterson's ability to make a 
"rational decision" was made by the court. The obvious absence 
of a rational decision analysis was again apparent in the only 
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other Utah case that has relied on this test. In Anderson v. 
Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988), the court merely 
stated in its analysis "there is no evidence that [the 
plaintiff] was unable to understand the nature of the 
proceedings or was unable to transact business." Id. at 100. 
The test repeatedly used in determining the competency 
of a person to contract in Utah has not been construed to 
include a second part that requires a showing of inability to 
make a "rational decision" in addition to lack of 
understanding. Assuming, therefore, that defendant had the 
burden to prove plaintiff's competency to contract, defendant 
was not required under Utah law to present evidence that 
plaintiff was also able to make a "rational decision." 
In addition, plaintiff's challenge of Le R Burton's 
and Agnes Freebairn's testimony that she was in fact competent 
and knew what she was doing at the time she sold her property 
is insufficient to disturb this finding. The trial judge is in 
the best position to judge the credibility of these witnesses' 
statements. Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). 
Likewise, plaintiff's inferences, drawn from Herbert Halliday's 
testimony, is no support for rejecting the trial court's 
finding that any presumption of incompetency was overcome by 
the evidence. It is the trial court's prerogative, not 
plaintiff's, to draw or reject inferences, and its conclusions 
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will not be disturbed on appeal. Movie Films, Inc. v. First 
Security Bank of Utah, 22 Utah 2d 1, 5, 447 P.2d 38, 40 
(1968). 
Plaintiff's final argument that the trial court's 
finding cannot stand because Mr. Scott took a different 
position in a prior proceeding is also erroneous. Defendants' 
present position, and the trial court's finding, is that 
plaintiff was competent to contract at the time she sold her 
property in 1971. The prior proceeding plaintiff now refers to 
is Weinstocks v. Mary Jean Freebairn, wherein Mr. Scott 
asserted the defense of incompetency to contract, on behalf of 
plaintiff, against a claim that plaintiff contracted for goods 
2 in 1981. Certainly the issue of competency to contract in 
1971 is not the same as competency in 1981. Moreover, 
plaintiff's reasoning that defendant cannot now claim plaintiff 
was competent to contract in 1971 is faulty because she 
The Answer attached as Appendix F to Appellant's Brief, 
from which plaintiff argues that Mr. Scott is taking a position 
which is different from an earlier position raised in a 
judicial proceeding, is not a part of the record below, and 
cannot now be brought before this court and used by plaintiff. 
In order to clarify the record, however, defendants are 
attaching as the Addendum the Complaint to which the Answer 
responded. 
2 
Id. The Complaint alleges at paragraph 2 that goods 
were sold and delivered between January 1, 1981 and December 
31, 1981. 
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misconstrues the court's statement in Condas v. Condas, 618 
P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) which she cites in support of this 
claim. The rule that a party cannot take a different position 
in a subsequent judicial proceeding applies only where the 
party previously obtained relief on the basis of the prior 
position. Id.; see also Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 P.2d 
595, 596 (Utah 1984). Plaintiff has not shown, or even argued, 
that defendant obtained relief on the basis of the defense 
3 
asserted in the Weinstock's action. 
Plaintifffs arguments, which fail to show how the 
court's findings are erroneous, also fail to provide any viable 
reason for finding plaintiff to be incompetent to contract when 
she agreed to sell her property in 1971. Substantial evidence, 
on the other hand, supports the trial court's findings that 
plaintiff was competent to contract. 
Defendants presented the testimony of Dr. John L. 
Malouff, a clinical psychologist, who stated that he tested 
plaintiff's "verbal intelligence." Dr. Malouff testified that 
this test dealt with plaintiff's "ability to reason," among 
Although this issue is not properly before this court, 
defendants further inform the court, in order to clarify the 
baseless nature of plaintiff's argument, that Mr. Scott in fact 
paid Weinstock's on this claim. Hence, no relief was obtained 
upon the defense that plaintiff was incompetent to contract in 
1981. 
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other things. (Record pp. 481-82.) Plaintiff received a high 
enough score on this test to put her the ninety-nine plus 
percentile. (Record p. 483.) When asked his opinion as to 
plaintiff's ability, in the 1970-71 time period, to transact 
business, Dr. Malouff stated that plaintiff "would have 
adequate knowledge to know if she was selling something, what 
she was selling, what she was receiving for it, those sorts of 
specifics." (Record p. 497.) 
Agnes Freebairn, plaintiff's sister-in-law, also 
testified that plaintiff had accumulated bills, and that 
plaintiff told her that she needed the money from selling the 
property to pay her debts. (Record pp. 525-26, 533.) Both 
Agnes Freebairn and plaintiff, consequently, then went to Le R 
Burton to have the property offered for sale. ( Id-) Mr. 
Burton testified that plaintiff set the actual purchase price. 
(Record p. 690.) Mr. Burton further testified that he had been 
involved in several prior transactions, during 1967 to 1970, 
wherein plaintiff sold real property in order to obtain money 
to pay her financial obligations. (Record pp. 666-75.) He 
also stated that plaintiff conducted herself like other sellers 
he had been involved with, except that she was more demanding 
as to detailed information. (Record p. 666.) Agnes Freebairn 
also testified that plaintiff handled their discussions with 
Mr. Burton and that plaintiff acted very business-like. 
(Record pp. 529, 532.) 
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When the property did not sell, it was plaintiff1s 
idea to ask Mr. Scott to purchase the property, which offer Mr. 
Scott initially refused. (Record p. 527.) Mr. Burton also 
testified that it was plaintiff's idea to put the proceeds from 
the sale into a trust, and that plaintiff worked out the 
details with her attorney, LaMar Duncan. (Record pp. 695-99.) 
Moreover, both Agnes Freebairn and Mr. Burton testified that 
plaintiff did not discuss matters reflecting her paranoia 
during their meetings pertaining to the sale of the property. 
(Record pp. 532-33, 666, 670, 675, 687.) 
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial 
court's findings that plaintiff had the capacity to enter into 
a binding contract. Even if defendants had the burden of 
proof, therefore, the trial court's finding that they met the 
burden is supported by substantial evidence and should not be 
disturbed. 
B. THE EVIDENCE ALSO SUPPORTS THE FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT EXERCISE FRAUD 
OR UNDUE INFLUENCE OVER PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff's arguments, made in Point III of 
Appellant's Brief, are also unfounded and insufficient to upset 
the trial court's findings. Specifically, plaintiff claims 
that a presumption of undue influence exists, which defendants 
had the burden of rebutting, because of the "confidential 
relationship" arising out of Mr. Scott's appointment as her 
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guardian. Plaintiff's entire argument, consequently, is 
predicated on the existence of a confidential relationship. 
Plaintiff, however, was unable to prove that a confidential 
relationship existed. 
While ignoring that the guardianship proceedings did 
not occur until after plaintiff had entered into a binding 
contract to sell her property, as discussed under Point I, 
supra, plaintiff argues that the guardian-ward relationship 
creates a confidential relationship as a matter of law. 
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites Blodgett 
v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). This case was 
criticized, however, in Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 
345, 348 (Utah 1988) on the very language upon which plaintiff 
relies. Moreover, neither Blodgett or any other Utah case 
supports the specific proposition that a guardian-ward 
relationship is a confidential relationship, as a matter of 
law, for purposes of analyzing undue influence over contracting 
parties. 
It should be pointed out that plaintiff miscites 
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984) for the 
proposition that a rebuttable presumption of undue influence 
exists over transactions between those in a confidential 
relationship. Although defendants do not refute this principle 
of law, the Berrett case is totally inapplicable and adds no 
support to plaintiff's arguments. 
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The court, in Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 
401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965), which is also relied upon by 
plaintiff, is quite clear in defining what is necessary for a 
confidential relationship. The Bradbury Court stated that 
there must be "that degree of confidence in the other party 
which largely results in the substitution of the will of the 
later for that of the former in the material matters involved 
in the transaction/* Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713. In 
Bradbury, the court reversed the finding of a confidential 
relationship where the evidence revealed that each party was 
free to act on their own independent volition and will. Id. 
at 714. Furthermore, this holding was in light of the court's 
finding that there was "sincere affection, trust and 
confidence" between the parties. Id. at 713. 
The only specific evidence plaintiff relies on in 
support of her claim that there was a confidential relationship 
is found on page 45 of Appellantfs Brief. There is no doubt 
that the most plaintiff has shown is that she trusted 
defendant, and because of that trust she sold him her property 
and later entered into a guardian-ward relationship. 
Plaintiff, therefore, has clearly failed to show how she 
substituted Mr. Scott's will for that of her own. Hence, 
plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing the existence 
of a confidential relationship, and defendants were not 
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required to rebutt any presumption of undue influence. The 
trial court's refusal to find for plaintiff on this issue, 
therefore, should not be disturbed. 
Although the trial court did not find that a 
confidential relationship existed, it did find that if there 
was a confidential relationship, and hence, a presumption of 
undue influence, that defendants successfully rebutted the 
presumption. (Judgment, Law II and Conclusion 11 3.) Plaintiff 
challenges this finding on the grounds that the transaction was 
"unfair." In essence, plaintiff claims that the trial court's 
findings should be set aside because the sales price for 
plaintiff's property should have been higher. 
The narrow issue pertaining to the value of the 
property does not affect the trial court's overall finding that 
defendants did not exercise fraud or undue influence over 
plaintiff. Moreover, the trial court found that the property 
was valued at $3,100 to $5,500. (Judgment, Findings of Fact 
IF 24.) Plaintiff's own expert appraised it at $5,000. (Record 
pp. 597-600; Appellant's Brief p. 46.) Hence, the trial 
court's findings are consistent with plaintiff's own evidence. 
In addition, plaintiff's claims as to the 
inadmissibility of certain evidence pertaining to the value of 
the property are not well grounded since the trial court was 
apparently not adversely influenced. Also, plaintiff cannot 
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successfully challenge the trial court's findings on the 
grounds that evidence was wrongfully admitted, because 
evidentiary issues are not criticized in trials to a judge as 
they are in trials to a jury. In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 
2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972), the court stated: 
When the trial is to the court, the rulings 
upon admissibility of evidence are not required 
to be so strict, nor are they of such critical 
importance as where the trial is to the jury. 
This is so because it is assumed that the trial 
judge has superior knowledge as to the 
competency and effect which should be given 
evidence, and that he will make his findings 
and decision in conformity therewith. 
Id., 495 P.2d at 814. Plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled 
to have the trial court's findings regarding lack of fraud or 
undue influence set aside based on the trial court's admission 
of certain evidence pertaining to the limited issue of the 
proper value of plaintiff's property. 
In addition to the specific evidence discussed under 
subsection A of this Point, there is evidence to establish that 
plaintiff approached Mr. Burton to sell her property, and in 
fact the property was advertised for sale before Mr. Scott knew 
anything of plaintiff's need for money and desire to sell the 
property. (Record pp. 526-28, 676-690.) Moreover, plaintiff 
established the price for which the property was sold, without 
any counter-offer by Mr. Scott. (Record pp. 690-92.) 
Plaintiff also realized that Mr. Scott did not want to purchase 
her property and asked Mr. Burton to continue to advertise the 
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property in the multiple real estate listings, on signs, and in 
newspapers for three additional months before she had the 
Earnest Money Agreement prepared for Mr. Scott's signature. 
(Record pp. 680-92.) Only one other offer to purchase was made 
to plaintiff, which she rejected because the purchase price was 
too low. (Record p. 682.) 
Defendants' evidence is clearly sufficient to support 
the trial court's findings that plaintiff made up her own mind 
to sell the property; that she affirmatively acted to contact 
Mr. Burton and did all she could to have the property sold; 
that she established the sales price; that she sought out Mr. 
Scott to purchase the property; and that the sales price was 
fair and consistent with the market value at the time. 
(Judgment, Findings of Fact 1T1T 10-12, 23-24, 31.) The trial 
court's conclusion that defendants did not take advantage of 
plaintiff, perpetrate a fraud upon her or exercise undue 
influence over her by purchasing her property, and that 
defendants rebutted any presumption of undue influence, should 
be affirmed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO OBTAIN RELIEF 
FROM THIS COURT UNDER A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
THEORY. 
Plaintiff's final argument is that this court should 
impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of Mr. Scott's sale 
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of the land which he received in trade for the property he 
purchased from plaintiff. This argument must be rejected for 
several reasons, as stated below. 
For her statement of Utah law pertaining to 
constructive trusts, plaintiff relies on Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983). Plaintiff, 
however, merely cites dicta. The analysis used by the Parks 
Court in determining whether a constructive trust should be 
imposed in a particular situation, which plaintiff did not 
discuss in her brief, was whether the defendant would be 
"unjustly enriched" by retaining sole ownership over the 
property, which in turn depended on whether the plaintiff had 
an "equitable interest" in the property. Id. at 600; accord 
Close v. Adams, 657 P.2d 1351, 1352-53 (Utah 1983) (a 
constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust 
enrichment). Plaintiff has failed to argue, or even recognize, 
these essential elements for a constructive trust. 
The trial court did not enter a finding upon whether a 
constructive trust should be imposed. The trial courtfs 
findings against plaintiff on the issues pertaining to the 
validity of the sale rendered it unnecessary for the court to 
enter specific findings on whether plaintiff was entitled to 
relief on the theory of a constructive trust. 
In addition, a constructive trust cannot be imposed by 
this court because plaintiff has failed to show that the trial 
-34-
court erred in its findings against plaintiff. Since plaintiff 
has failed to state sufficient grounds for setting aside the 
trial court *s holding of no cause of action, she is therefore 
unable to now show entitlement to a constructive trust. Cf. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977) 
(constructive trusts normally arise out of fraud or breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
Furthermore, a constructive trust cannot be found by 
this court without findings of fact in support thereof. In 
Park v. Zions First National Bank, the inverse situation was 
presented where the defendants1 appealed from a judgment 
holding there to be a constructive trust. The defendants 
argued on appeal that the trial court did not enter findings 
with respect to the elements of a constructive trust. Park, 
673 P.2d at 601. The trial court stated that under Rule 52(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, findings of fact "must 
resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the 
conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon." Id. 
Although defendant's argument was considered to be well 
founded, the court reviewed the findings and held that they in 
fact supported the judgment. In the case at bar, there are no 
findings to support the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Consequently, even if the findings of the trial court 
pertaining to liability were found to be in error, there would 
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be no basis in the record for this court to find that all the 
necessary elements for a constructive trust were proven at 
trial. 
In addition, this court should refrain from making 
specific findings of fact pertaining to the elements of a 
constructive trust. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it 
will normally refrain from making findings of fact. Bill Nay 
& Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 
1123 (Utah 1984); see also Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 
462 (Utah App. 1987)(it is not the function of an appellate 
court to make findings of fact because it does not have the 
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify). There 
is no pressing need for this court to enter its own findings of 
fact and it should refrain, therefore, from second guessing the 
trial court's review and interpretation of the evidence. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief she seeks from 
this court. Her claim for recovery under a constructive trust 
theory, therefore, should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to clearly state the relief she 
is seeking from this court. To the extent plaintiff seeks to 
have this court reverse the trial court's judgment or set aside 
any of its findings, whether to support a reversal or remand, 
plaintiff has failed to express any viable reason in her 
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lengthy brief to support such relief. Based upon the foregoing 
arguments, it is apparent that plaintifffs appeal is not well 
taken, and she should not be granted any relief thereon. 
Defendants request, therefore, that plaintiff be 
denied any relief she may seek through this appeal, and that 
the judgment of the trial court below be affirmed. 
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RESPONDENTS J. RUSSELL SCOTT AND LE R BURTON to be hand 
delivered this 14th day of March, 1989, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Timothy C. Houpt, Esq. 
Barry Lawrence, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Co#*t krd&bo>v*n 
8267m 
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ADDENDUM 
- 3 9 -
F I L E D 
JAY A. MESERVY 
VERHAAREN & MESERVY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
820 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-5555 
rJUH 2 51982 
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE DIVISION 
O f(oC (1 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
THE CARTER HAWLEY HALE STORE, 
INC.f dba WEINSTOCK'S, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY JEAN FREEBAIRN, 
Defendant, 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. «?•; c^-Vs^o 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and complains of the defendant and 
alleges as follows: 
1. The defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 
One Thousand Five Hundred and Twenty-Six Dollars and Three Cents 
($1,526.03) for goods and materials sold and delivered between 
the approximate dates of January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1981, 
together with interest thereon from and after the first day of/ 
January, 1982, at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum on 
the first one thousana collars and twelve percent (12%) per annum 
on the balance of the obligation. 
3. Pursuant to written agreement, a copy of which is 
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, the 
defendant agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fee; a reasonable 
attorney's fee would be one third of the amount found by the 
court to be due and owing. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant 
in the sum of $1,526.03, together with interest thereon from and 
after the first day of January, 1982 at the rate of 18% per annum 
for the first one thousand dollars and 12% per annum for the 
amount in excess of one thousand dollars, for attorney's fees 
equal to one third of the amount found by the court to be due and 
owing, for costs of court herein incurred, and for general 
relief. 
DATED this day of June, 1982. 
Plaintiff's address; 
1701 Arden Way 
Sacramento, California 95815 
